This study investigates whether and how accounting conservatism improves the corporate information environment. We argue that conservatism facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outsiders and leads to a highquality information environment. Using the Basu (1997) model to capture the extent of accounting conservatism and firm-specific return variation to proxy for the quality of information environment, we find that conservatism is positively associated with the improvement of the corporate information environment in our sample of 43 countries. We also find that such an information role of conservatism is more pronounced in countries with weaker protection of private property rights, suggesting that conservatism substitutes for legal institutions in ensuring the quality of information environment.
1 LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that outside equity investors demand more conservative earnings as a means of mitigating agency problems. They show that changes in information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors lead to changes in accounting conservatism. 2 A growing body of international accounting and finance literature reports that country-level institutions play a firstorder role in shaping financial reporting incentives (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Bushman et al. 2011) . Therefore, using an international dataset increases the probability of directly detecting the information role of conservatism.
Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris2002; Holthausen and Watts 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . 3 Building on this stream of research, we contend that conservative accounting, as part of a firm's disclosure policies, facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outsiders. Following Basu (1997) , accounting conservatism is defined as asymmetric recognition of economic gains and losses into earnings, and thus equals timeliness of loss recognition (TLR hereafter) minus timeliness of gain recognition (TGR hereafter).
Prior studies suggest that TLR is much more important than TGR in determining accounting conservatism and its effects (e.g., Basu 1997; Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; Francis and Martin 2010; Armstrong, Guay and Weber 2010) . It is expected that managers have economic incentives to voluntarily disclose gains (i.e., good news) and to suppress disclosing losses (i.e., bad news).
Financial reporting rules such as TLR that commit managers to disclosing bad news in a timely manner result in a more complete disclosure environment that facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outsiders (Armstrong et al. 2010) , and thus enhance the firmspecific stock return variation our measure of corporate information environment. 4 Therefore, we predict that accounting conservatism is positively associated with the quality of the corporate information environment.
Drawing on 130,869 firm-year observations from 43 economies for the 1998-2008 period, our results show that accounting conservatism is positively associated with the corporate information environment. More importantly, the association between TLR and the corporate information environment is significantly positive, while results on the association between TGR and the 3 Watts (2003) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that conservatism helps to address agency problems. Zhang (2008) documents that firms that apply more accounting conservatism experience faster debt covenant violations, thus "triggering the alarm" for borrowers earlier. shows that more conditionally conservative firms enjoy lower bid-ask spreads on the secondary loan markets. Ahmed et al. (2002) show that debt-holders view conservatism as a means of minimizing agency problems between debt-holders and shareholders, and thus accounting conservatism is negatively related to cost of debt. Ball, Bushman and Vasvari (2008) show that conservatism leads underwriters to hold a lower stake in issued loans. Altogether, these studies provide evidence suggesting that conservatism is an effective tool in reducing information asymmetry and monitoring managers' behavior. 4 Following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) and others, we use firm-specific return variation to proxy for a firm's information environment. Greater firm-specific return variation indicates more firm-specific information being impounded in stock prices, higher price informativeness, and thus a better information environment (Morck, Yeung and Yu 2000; Jin and Myers 2006) . corporate information environment are mixed, indicating that the TLR aspect of accounting conservatism is more important than TGR in facilitating the flow of firm-specific information from insiders to outside investors. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the positive relation between accounting conservatism and corporate information environment is significantly more pronounced in countries with weaker protection of private property rights. Our findings highlight the effective role of conservative accounting as a governance mechanism in enhancing the quality of a corporate information environment. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including alternative models for measuring conservatism, different measures for corporate information environment, and various proxies of investor protection.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, accounting conservatism is an important dimension of the quality of corporate information environment (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Wang 2006 ). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no direct evidence to substantiate the information role of accounting conservatism. By documenting a positive association between accounting conservatism and the quality of information environment, our study lends support to the information role of accounting conservatism, and sheds light on recent accounting literature examining the consequences of conservatism.
Second, our study employs an international dataset to explore the effects of accounting conservatism on information environment, an association that is difficult detect in a single-country setting. LaFond and Watts (2008) document that information asymmetry leads to more conservative financial reporting. However, probably due to the small variations of conservatism within a given country (Bushman et al. 2011; Bushman and Piotroski 2006) , they fail to detect the effect of accounting conservatism on information asymmetry. Our study extends LaFond and Watts (2008) by demonstrating that accounting conservatism does improve a firm's information environment, and thus helps to explain why information asymmetry could pressure managers to use accounting conservatism.
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Third, our study stresses the important governance role of conservatism as a substitute for country-level legal institutions in efforts to ensure a high-quality information environment. Thus, in order to provide a better corporate information environment, managers can adopt conservative accounting-especially in countries where good property protection institutions are unavailable.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the research hypotheses, and Section 3 specifies the research design. Section 4 describes data and presents descriptive statistics.
Our main empirical results are detailed in Section 5, and Section 6 reports the results of further tests.
Section 7 presents robustness checks. Section 8 discusses research implications and limitations, with conclusions provided in Section 9.
Hypothesis Development
Accounting conservatism triggers the recognition of losses (i.e., bad news) in earnings when they are probable, but defers the recognition of gains (i.e., good news) until they are verifiable.
Managers are expected to have economic incentives for voluntarily disclosing gains and suppressing losses for their own interests. Financial reporting rules such as TLR that commit managers to disclosing bad news in a timely manner result in a more complete disclosure environment that facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outsiders. We therefore predict that accounting conservatism and TLR are positively associated with the quality of information environment. Accounting conservatism is measured as the asymmetric timeliness of bad news versus good news recognition (Basu, 1997) , and hence both TLR and TGR are reflected in our measure of conservatism.
The effect of TGR on price informativeness is expected to be relatively weak Under conservatism, the requirements for verifiability of gain recognition can have two opposing effects on a firm's information environment. On one hand, highly verifiable gain information-the untimely recognition of gains (i.e., lower TGR)-constrains managers' ability to overstate performance, and thus improves the information quality of gains. It can also discipline other sources 5 of information, especially when information is firm-specific, that are useful for investors' decisionmaking (Ball 2001; LaFond and Watts 2008) . From this perspective, for the firms with lower TGR, investors have a greater ability to obtain more precise firm-specific information and to incorporate such information into stock prices, resulting in a more informative information environment. On the other hand, however, higher requirements for verifiability of gain recognition (lower TGR) may limit the flow of firm-specific earnings information from well-motivated insiders on gains that,
though not yet fully realized, is valuable to outsiders. This is especially true for firms with substantial investment opportunities (Armstrong et al. 2010) . From this perspective, lower TGR might cloud a firm's information environment. Essentially, given the two opposing effects of TGR on stock price informativeness, the net effect presents an empirical question.
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Combining the TLR and TGR aspects of conservatism, we predict that accounting conservatism is positively associated with stock price informativeness. Our analysis leads to the following hypotheses:
H1:
The quality of corporate information environment increases with accounting conservatism.
H1a:
The quality of corporate information environment increases with TLR.
H1b: The quality of corporate information environment increases/decreases with TGR.
Well-functioning legal institutions constrain insiders' private control benefits by making wealth expropriation legally riskier and more expensive (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2000; Nenova 2003; Leuz et al. 2003) . Accordingly, in countries with strong legal institutions, insiders have limited economic incentive to overstate firm performance. This could weaken the role that accounting conservatism plays in constraining managers from suppressing realized losses and recognizing unrealized gains. Alternatively, in countries with weak protection of legal institutions where alternative sources of information (such as voluntary disclosure) are limited (Bushman et al. 6 2004; Jin and Myers 2006) , a more important role in facilitating the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outsiders is likely played by the provision of more useful (less exaggerated and timelier) accounting information through conservatism Therefore, the marginal effects of accounting conservatism on information environment are expected to be stronger in countries with poorly functioning legal institutions.
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We focus on the legal institution of investors' property rights. Morck et al. (2000) show that strong protection of property rights promotes informed arbitrage and affects the extent to which information is capitalized into stock prices. Prior studies suggest that to prevent outside investors'
interests from being expropriated, firm-level corporate governance mechanisms could substitute for country-level institutions (e.g., Durnev and Kim 2005; Fan and Wong 2005) . Therefore, the role of accounting conservatism can be more important in eliciting informed stock trading, and in improving the corporate information environment in countries without strong property rights protection in place.
The overall discussions as outlined above lead us to predict a stronger effect of accounting conservatism on the quality of information environment when legal institutions are weak. Therefore, our second hypothesis is stated as below: 
Research Design

Measuring information environment quality
Following prior studies, our primary proxy of information environment is relative firm-specific stock return variation-that is, FRV, which is calculated using weekly stock trading data based on an expanded market model, as in Jin and Myers (2006) . As shown below, the model regresses stock returns of firms on the local and U.S. market index returns of five periods (from week t-2 to t+2): 
In the above equation, r j,t is the return on stock j in week t (in market m), r m,t and r US,t are the primary local and U.S. market index returns, and e m,t is the change in exchange rate against the U.S. (2006), we add two lag and lead terms of market returns in the model to control any potential nonsynchronous trading problem. Stocks that trade for less than 30 weeks during a particular year are excluded. Again following Jin and Myers (2006) , if a country has fewer than 25 stocks with valid data in a year, we exclude the country for that year.
dollar. Following Jin and Myers
The firm-specific return variation is estimated as the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility. Given the bounded nature of R 2 , we conduct our tests using a logistic transformation of
). log( ) 1 log( (2) 7 Our results are qualitatively the same if we alternatively use the two-factor model of Morck et al. (2000) that regresses firm stock returns on the contemporary local and U.S. market index returns. As mentioned, we prefer the expanded market model of Jin and Myers (2006) because the model includes two lag and lead terms of market returns to control for the potential nonsynchronous trading problem.
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FRV measures firm-specific stock return variation relative to market-wide variation, or a lack of synchronicity with the market. A higher value of FRV indicates more firm-specific information impounded into the stock prices via trading by investors, and thus a more informative corporate environment (French and Roll 1986; Roll 1988; Morck et al. 2000; Jin and Myers 2006) .
Considering that firms in some countries are subject to more country-wide shocks than is the case for other countries (Fernandes and Ferreira 2009 ), we scale firm-specific stock return variation by the total variation in returns. Using the method proposed by Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) , we also construct two variables, namely AFRV and ASRV, to measure the absolute firm-specific stock return variation and absolute systematic stock return variation, respectively. AFRV and ASRV are calculated as the natural logarithms of idiosyncratic volatility (σ2) and systematic volatility (R 2 ) of Eq. (2).
Model specification
In this paper, accounting conservatism is measured as the incremental timeliness of bad news recognition over good news recognition (Basu, 1997) . Following Bushman et al. (2011) , 8 we use the model below to capture the timeliness of good news recognition versus bad news recognition:
where NI is net income before extraordinary items, deflated by the beginning period of market capitalization. R it is firm i's annual stock returns for the year ending three months after year t. D is an indicator variable equal to one if R is less than zero, and zero otherwise.
The estimate b 2 of the above regression measures TGR, and b 3 measures the incremental timeliness of bad news recognition over good news recognition. The asymmetric timeliness coefficient b 3 is used to measure the degree of accounting conservatism, which is of primary 9 interest in this study. TLR is measured by b 2 + b 3 .
To test H1, following a number of models, specifically those proposed by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and Francis and Martin (2010) , we expand the baseline Basu (1997) 
where FRV t+1 is firm-specific stock return variation of year t+1 estimated from the international expended model that includes local and U.S. market index returns. We use four control variables, namely, firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MB), and litigation risk (LIT), plus their interactions with the three terms in the baseline Basu (1997) model. These control variables have been shown to be related to timely loss/gain recognition and conservatism (e.g., Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Francis and Martin, 2010) . SIZE is the natural log of total assets in million US dollars at the fiscal year end. LEV is the financial leverage measured as the sum of short-and long-term debts to total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio. LIT is coded as one if a firm is in a litigious industry (SIC code: 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370) , and zero otherwise.
H1 predicts β 8 to be significantly positive, and H1a predicts the sum of β 7 and β 8 to be significantly positive. H1b has no prediction on the sign of β 7 .
To test H2, we regress the following model to detect the effects of private property rights on the association between accounting conservatism and firm-specific return variation: 
where GGI is the good government index, a proxy for private property rights protection (as in Morck et al. (2002) ). GGI is constructed as the sum of three indexes from La Porta et al. (1998) : (1) government corruption; (2) the risk of expropriation of private property by the government; and (3) the risk of the government repudiating contracts (Morck et al. 2000) . Such an approach of measurement causes the original values of GGI to be negatively skewed and highly concentrated within the range of 20-30, as shown in Table 1 . Therefore, we transform the original GGI into a rank variable RKGGI. 9 A higher rank value of RKGGI, therefore, indicates stronger property rights protection.
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our which is consistent with prior studies such as Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) .
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Primary Empirical Results
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Our multivariate tests are estimated using an ordinary regression model. In all regressions, we report robust t-statistics after correcting for firm-clustered standard errors that are likely to be present in the panel data (Petersen 2009 (2) and (3), respectively.
As shown in column (1) of Table 3 , the coefficient on D*R is significantly positive, indicating, in the overall, the existence of accounting conservatism in our 43 sample countries. 
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Taken together, the empirical results in Table 3 show positive association between asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition and information environment, suggesting that accounting conservatism facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices and, hence, improves the corporate information environment. Moreover, the TLR aspect of accounting conservatism is more important than the TGR aspect of accounting conservatism in affecting firms' information environment.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Empirical evidence on how private property rights protection affects the association between accounting conservatism and information environment
In this section, we present the results of tests of our second hypothesis (H2) that explores the role of country-level property rights protection on the association between accounting conservatism and information environment. We compare the information role of conservatism across countries based on the rank variable of good governance index RKGGI, and summarize the regression results in Table 4 .
Consistent with H1, D*R*FRV t+1 is significantly positive in relation to NI in both columns (0.152, with p<0.01 in column (1); 0.099, with p<0.01 in column (2)). More importantly, the coefficients for the interaction term on D*R*FRV t+1 *RKGGI are significantly negative at the 5% level or above, thus suggesting that the effects of accounting conservatism on information environment are significantly more (less) pronounced in countries with weaker (stronger) protection for private property rights. The results for the TLR are also consistent with our expectation of the greater information role of conservatism in countries with weaker property rights protection. 11 In combination, our results highlight the important governance role of conservatism as a substitute for legal institutions in ensuring a high-quality information environment, which is 11 Consistent with the TLR expectation in H2a, the sum of the coefficients on R*FRV t+1 *RKGGI and D*R*FRV t+1 * RKGGI is significantly negative in Table 4 . The TGR expectation is less important, and we consistently find insignificant results regarding H2b (e.g., the insignificant coefficient on R*FRV t+1 *RKGGI).
14 consistent with H2.
[Insert Table 4 about here] Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) argue that the total return variation of a firm's stock consists of two parts: firm-specific return variation and systematic return variation. In this subsection, we follow Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) , and disentangle the total stock return variation into firmspecific return variation (AFRV) and systematic return variation (ASRV). We are then able to examine how accounting conservatism directly affects them. Unlike FRV, which is calculated as the firm-specific stock return variation divided by the total return variation, AFRV is the absolute return variation. H1 predicts that accounting conservatism is positively associated with AFRV, but has no prediction on the association between accounting conservatism and ASRV. The untabulated results indicate that accounting conservatism is positively associated with next-period firm-specific stock return variation, but it is negatively associated with next-period systematic stock return variation.
Further Tests
Testing conservatism's effect on firm-specific and systematic return variation
Therefore, our results suggest that conservatism improves information environment not only because conservatism facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outside investors, but it also reduces investors' exposure to market risk.
Applying change models
In our main tests, we examine the association between the current conservatism and the firmspecific return variation of the next period. The model specifications assume that changes in conservatism lead to changes in the information environment. In this subsection, we use change models to further investigate how accounting conservatism can be associated with changes of price informativeness in three different periods: past period (t-1), current period (t), and future period (t+1). If it is the application of accounting conservatism that causes the improvement in a firm's information environment and not the reverse, we should observe that the change of firm-specific return variation during t and t+1 are positively associated with current-period accounting conservatism. However, such an association should not exist for the change of firm-specific return variation of period t-1. Briefly, our analysis shows that whereas conservatism is positively associated with the current-and next-period FRV increases, the effect of conservatism on the change of FRV in the lagged period is statistically insignificant. Overall, we provide evidence supporting our argument that the application of accounting conservatism leads to improvement of the information environment.
Robustness Checks
Alternative measure of information environment
Although firm-specific stock return variation is widely accepted in the literature as a proxy for the quality of a firm's information environment, it is not used in this way without controversy.
Limits to arbitrage, pricing errors, and noisy trading could also result in firm-specific return volatility. A more direct proxy for the information environment of stock trading is a measure based on informed stock trading volume. Following Ferreira (2008, 2009) , we additionally employ the model developed by Llorente et al. (2002) 12 to estimate informed stock trading. The untabulated results using informed stock trading are qualitatively unchanged.
Causality analyses between change of price informativeness and change of accounting conservatism
Another important concern is that our tests indicate only the association between accounting conservatism and firm-specific return variation, rather than revealing the causality between them, although our analyses applying the change models in Section 6.2 show that conservatism's effect exists primarily in the future rather than in the past. To assuage this concern, we conduct further causality analysis between change of information environment and change of accounting conservatism. Specifically, we estimate an average coefficient of conservatism for each three-digit SIC industry year using the pooled cross-sectional Basu (1997) and ΔFRV t+1 ), we find no significant results. Therefore, our causality analyses suggest that it is the increase of conservatism that leads to improvement of the information environment, not the reverse.
Other robustness checks
We conduct several additional robustness checks. First, in addition to the investor protection proxy using GGI, we re-estimate the model using two alternative proxies of investors' rights protection that recent studies have frequently used (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski 2006; McLean, Zhang and Zhao 2012; Peek, Cuijpers and Buijink 2010) . One is a comprehensive investor protection variable, PROTECT, which captures both the letter of the law and the strength of law enforcement, and the other is a public enforcement index, PUBENF. 13 Both proxies are from La Porta et al. (2006) . Empirical results using the alternative measures of investor protection produce results consistent with our main test.
Second, although Basu (1997) regression as a baseline model is widely used in extant accounting literature (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Francis and Martin, 2010) , the number of variables used and interacted in the regression models raises the concern of a potential multicollinearity problem. To alleviate this concern, we demean the continuous variables (i.e., FRV, NI, R, SIZE, and MB) by subtracting the sample means from them and then repeating our main regression analyses (reported in Tables 3 and 4 ). The untabulated results under this demeaning approach are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 3 and 4, suggesting that it is unlikely that our findings are driven by the multicollinearity problem.
14 Third, an important concern in international studies is that a number of fundamental marketlevel factors, such as legal origins, economy, and capital market development, could affect the empirical results. To ensure that our regression results are not driven by important but omitted market-level variables, we include several market-level control variables in our regressions to capture fundamentals of an economy: legal origins, gross domestic product per capita, and stock market capitalization. Our analysis shows that the findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of these market fundamental variables.
Fourth, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue that the beginning composition of equity value affects asymmetric timeliness measured over short horizons. Specifically, past timeliness of earnings with respect to returns influences future earnings timeliness over short periods, which might affect the results of Basu's (1997) model. To mitigate the concern that a one-year Basu's (1997) model might lead to biased results, we re-estimate our regression models using earnings and returns over two-and three-year periods. The (untabulated) results of replicating Tables 3 and 4 using two-or three-year asymmetric timeliness measures are similar to those of the main tables.
Finally, the data being used in our main test is for 43 countries, but is highly skewed in terms of the number of observations. To ensure that the results are not driven by the data issue, we exclude country-years with fewer than 100 observations, and reproduce Table 4 . Our main results (untabulated) remain unchanged.
Implications and Limitations
This study provides evidence that accounting conservatism plays an important role in facilitating the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outside investors, and thus helping to improve the corporate information environment. Our findings are in line with prior literature indicating that conservatism is not only an essential property of accounting that can, arguably, alleviate information asymmetry (LaFond and Watts, 2008) , but is also a key mechanism that improves corporate governance efficacy and mitigates managerial opportunism (e.g., Ball 2001; Watts 2003; Francis and Martin 2010) . The findings of this study imply that users of financial reports and standard-setting bodies for accounting need to pay closer attention to the information role of accounting conservatism. Our evidence supports the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in its call for the increased and timely disclosure of financial accounting information.
This position stands in opposition to the FASB's view that this time-honored accounting principle, to a certain extent, limits the information role of financial statements in equity markets.
Furthermore, this study indicates that the information role of conservative accounting is more pronounced in countries with poor protection of private property rights. Our findings imply that conservatism substitutes, at least to a certain extent, for legal protection of private property rights to ensure the quality of the corporate information environment. Therefore, in an environment with poor legal protection, outside stakeholders may resort to firm-level conservatism to be better informed about corporate insiders' value-creation actions and agency behavior.
Our results are robust to a series of sensitivity tests and regression specifications. However, we acknowledge that our reliance on a skewed data set in terms of the number of observations across the 43 countries constitutes the central limitation of this study. 15 To the extent that the highly skewed nature of the data matters in the context of our study, it provides potential bias in our findings. In addition, our reliance on the imperfect proxies for conservatism and information environment, especially for a cross-country sample, could be another limitation of this study.
Conclusions
Our study examines how accounting conservatism affects the corporate information environment, and how country-level legal institutions influence this effect. Using 130,869
observations from 43 countries for the period of 1998-2008, our results show that, on average, accounting conservatism improves the quality of the corporate information environment, and that this information role of conservative reporting is more pronounced in countries with weak legal protection for private property rights. We interpret our results as being consistent with the notion that users of accounting information benefit from the adoption of accounting conservatism, in that conservatism constrains the ability of corporate insiders to suppress bad news and overstate firm performance, thereby increasing the preciseness and timeliness of stock price incorporating management value-creation actions.
Our study extends LaFond and Watts's (2008) study by demonstrating that accounting conservatism does improve a firm's information environment, and thus helps to explain why information asymmetry could drive managers to adopt accounting conservatism. Furthermore, by documenting a positive association between accounting conservatism and the improvement of the information environment, this study contributes to the recent literature on the consequences of conservative reporting. Our sensitivity tests suggest that our documented evidence is less likely to be driven by model bias or measurement errors. Overall, this study highlights the information role of accounting conservatism, especially in countries with weak legal protection for property rights. 
△FRV
The change of firm-specific stock return variation (FRV).
AFRV
The natural logarithm of the absolute firm-specific stock return variation.
ASRV
The natural logarithm of the absolute systematic stock return variation. MB Market-to-book ratio.
NI
LEV
Financial leverage, measured as the ratio of short-and long-term debts to total assets.
LIT
LIT is coded as one if a firm is in a litigious industry (SIC code: 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370) , and zero otherwise.
GGI
The Good Government Index. GGI is a proxy for private property rights protection, measured as the sum of government corruption, the risk of expropriation of private property by the government, and the risk of the government repudiating contracts. Data source: La Porta et al. (1998) .
RKGGI
The rank of GGI. A higher rank value means stronger property rights. 
